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IS THE SHAM AFFIDAVIT RULE ITSELF A SHAM, DESIGNED
TO GIVE THE TRIAL COURT MORE DISCRETION AT THE
SUMMARY JUDGMENT LEVEL?
I. INTRODUCTION
The Maryland courts are currently required to disregard affidavits
submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment if the
affidavit materially contradicts the affiant's prior deposition
testimony.1  This practice has been dubbed the "sham affidavit
rule."2 The Court of Appeals of Maryland's Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure recommended Maryland's adoption
of the sham affidavit rule in their One Hundred Fifty-Second Report
to the Court of Appeals of Maryland.3 The Court of Appeals of
Maryland accepted the Rules Committee's recommendation, and
amended Maryland Rule 2-501 to include the sham affidavit rule.4 In
adopting the sham affidavit rule, Maryland followed in the footsteps
of several states as well as every federal circuit that has confronted
5the issue.
Maryland Rule 2-501(e) currently allows a judge to grant summary
judgment despite having an affidavit that presents a dispute as to a
material fact. The only exception to this rule is if the testimony in
the affidavit is based on new information not known to the affiant at
the time of his deposition.
An example will better help explain how Maryland Rule 2-501(e)
works in practice. A plaintiff sues alleging that she suffered personal
injuries that resulted. from defendant's negligence. During her
1. MD. R. 2-501(e).
2. Pittman v. Atl. Realty Co., 359 Md. 513, 517, 754 A.2d 1030, 1032 (2000). The
phrase "sham affidavit rule" is used when referring to Maryland Rule 2-501(e), but
the phrase "sham affidavit doctrine" is used when referring to the federal approach to
sham affidavits, which is derived from past court decisions. See Jiminez v. All Am.
Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007) ("This principle of summary
judgment practice is often referred to as the 'sham affidavit doctrine."' (quoting
Perma Research & Dev. Co. v. Singer Co., 410 F.2d 572, 577-78 (2d Cir. 1969))).
3. 30 Md. Reg. 1907-08 (Dec. 26, 2003).
4. Court of Appeals of Maryland Rules Order, 30 Md. Reg. 1907-08 (Dec. 26, 2003).
5. See Judge Randy Wilson, The Sham Affidavit Doctrine in Texas, 66 TEX. B. J. 962,
964-65 (Dec. 2003); Jiminez, 503 F.3d at 252.
6. MD. R. 2-501(e)(2)(B).
7. Id.
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deposition the plaintiff recites facts that indicate she was also
negligent. Because Maryland is a contributory negligence state, the
defendant files a motion for summary judgment. In opposition to the
motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff submits an affidavit that
casts a different light on the facts and eliminates the possibility of
contributory negligence. Under Maryland Rule 2-501(e), assuming
the affidavit is not based on new information, the trial judge must
disregard the affidavit and grant summary judgment if the affidavit
"materially contradicts" the deposition testimony. 8  The judge is
given discretion to decide whether the recollection set forth in the
affidavit "materially contradicts" the prior sworn statement, a
function usually reserved for the jury.9
The origins of the sham affidavit doctrine, the foundation of
Maryland's sham affidavit rule, can be traced back to the Second
Circuit's 1969 decision in Perma Research & Development Co. v.
Singer Co. 1o The Perma opinion stated three justifications for the
sham affidavit doctrine." They have been classified: "reliability,"
"utility," and "fairness."' 12  The arguments are that deposition
testimony is more reliable than an affidavit; summary judgment's
utility of weeding out false claims can only be preserved by striking
inconsistent affidavits; and it would be unfair, to the moving party, to
allow summary judgment to be defeated by an inconsistent statement
made by the opposing party. 13
This Comment illustrates how Maryland's current sham affidavit
rule is in violation of the right to have a jury decide issues of fact. 14
This Comment also illustrates how the justifications set forth for the
sham affidavit rule can each be achieved in a less restrictive
manner.' 5  Part II broadly traces the establishment of the sham
affidavit doctrine in the federal courts.' 6 The federally recognized
exceptions to the rule are broadly outlined and examined. 7 Part III
describes Maryland's adoption of the sham affidavit rule through a
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. 410 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1969).
11. Pittman v. At. Realty Co., 359 Md. 513, 529, 754 A.2d 1030, 1038 (2000) (citing
Perma, 410 F.2d at 578).
12. Id. at 529, 754 A.2d at 1038; Michael Holley, Making Credibility Determinations at
Summary Judgment: How Judges Broaden their Discretion While "Playing by the
Rules," 20 WHITIER L. REV. 865, 880-81 (1999).
13. Perma, 410 F.2d at 578; Pittman, 359 Md. at 529, 754 A.2d at 1038.
14. See infra Part V.A. 1.
15. See infra Part V.
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part II.A. 1.
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182004 amendment to Maryland Rule 2-501. Part IV examines the
justifications articulated by the proponents of the sham affidavit
rule.' 9 Finally, Part V explains how Maryland's current rule is
unconstitutional and how the justifications supporting the sham
affidavit rule can each be achieved in a less restrictive manner. 0 The
Comment concludes that Maryland Rule 2-501(e), the sham affidavit
rule, allows the trial court to encroach on the jury's fact-finding
domain in violation of the Constitution of Maryland. 2 1  The
Comment further concludes that affidavits inconsistent on their face
can be submitted to the jury, while still safeguarding the utility of
summary judgment and retaining fairness for the moving party;
therefore, there is no need for the sham affidavit rule to continue.
22
II. THE SHAM AFFIDAVIT RULE IS ESTABLISHED
Federal courts vary in their application of the sham affidavit rule
because the "Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not address
situations involving offsetting affidavits."2 3 Pursuant to Rule 56, the
court may only grant a motion for summary judgment under very
narrow circumstances:
The [summary] judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.24
"The plain language of this rule allows affidavits to be considered
in summary judgment motions, and affidavits are central to summary
judgment practice. 25  A party opposing a motion for summary
judgment must submit an affidavit that "set[s] forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. The Federal Rules,
however, "do not contain an express prohibition of offsetting
18. See infra Part 1II.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See infra Part V.
21. See infra Part VI.
22. See infra Part VI.
23. Collin J. Cox, Note, Reconsidering the Sham Affidavit Doctrine, 50 DUKE L.J. 261,
266 (2000).
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
25. Cox, supra note 23, at 266.
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see also Cox, supra note 23, at 266.
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affidavits; the sham affidavit doctrine has derived instead from the
courts."
2 7
A. The Court's Role During Summary Judgment is Altered. Perma
Research & Development Co. v. Singer Co.
The sham affidavit doctrine emerged in the Second Circuit's Perma
Research & Development Co. v. Singer Co. decision. 28  Perma
Research brought suit for fraudulent breach of contract, "alleging that
substantial numbers of an automobile anti-skid braking device
assembled by the defendant, The Singer Company ("Singer"), were
'defective due to inadequate quality control.' 2 9  After Singer
concluded that the product could not be made fail-safe, a recall of the
product commenced and "Singer advised Perma that it was
abandoning the project until the 'fail-safe' problem could be
resolved." Singer's motion for summary judgment was granted
because "Perma failed to produce any evidence showing a fraudulent
intent on the part of Singer." 3' Frank Perrino, the president of Perma,
submitted an affidavit opposing summary judgment, in which he
stated that a Mr. Person of Singer told him Singer never had any
intention of performing the contract. 32 Perrino was deposed for four
days and, despite being "repeatedly asked to specify the basis of the
fraud he alleged, . . . he made no reference to the alleged
conversation" mentioned in the affidavit. 
33
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "[i]f there is any
dispute as to the material facts, it is only because of inconsistent
statements made by Perrino the deponent and Perrino the affiant." 34
The Second Circuit held that "[i]f a party who has been examined at
length on deposition could raise an issue of fact simply by submitting
an affidavit contradicting his own prior testimony, this would greatly
diminish the utility of summary , 3 udgment as a procedure for
screening out sham issues of fact." "The last four words of the
opinion thus gave birth to what has come to be known as the sham
affidavit doctrine, i.e., a trial court can disregard an affidavit that
offsets the affiant's prior deposition testimony where the
27. Cox, supra note 23, at 267.
28. 410 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1969).
29. Id. at 573.
30. Id. at 574.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 573, 577.
33. Id. at 578.
34. Id.
35. Id. (emphasis added).
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contradiction is unexplained and unqualified by the affiant." 36 The
Perma decision requires the trial court to "engage in two separate
inquiries, first [to] determin[e] if a contradiction exists and then [to]
determin[e] whether the contradiction is justified. 37 Following the
decision in Perma, every Federal Circuit which has considered the
issue has adhered to the sham affidavit rule in some form.
38
1. Exceptions to the Sham Affidavit Rule Recognized by the
Federal Circuits
The Federal Circuits do not allow trial judges to disregard
inconsistent affidavits in all circumstances. 39  "Presuming that an
offsetting affidavit is a sham can disadvantage respondents to
summary judgment' motions who have legitimate reasons for
contradicting prior deposition testimony." 40 Thus, two exceptions to
the sham affidavit doctrine have developed in the federal courts.
4 1
The leading federal case addressing exceptions to the sham affidavit
doctrine is Kennett-Murray Corp. v. Bone.42 In Kennett-Murray, the
court allowed the defendant to submit an offsetting affidavit in
response to a motion for summary judgment.43 The court allowed the
offsetting affidavit because it "explain[ed] certain aspects of his
deposition testimony.54 4 The affiant explained that he was confused
by the questions during his depositions.45 Furthermore, the court
held that the affidavit should be considered because the affiant's
"assertion [was] at least plausible., 46  The Kennett-Murray court
carved out a significant exception to the sham affidavit doctrine: "a
36. Wilson, supra note 5, at 964.
37. Cox, supra note 23, at 269.
38. Wilson, supra note 5, at 964, 968 n. 10.
39. See, e.g., Adelman-Tremblay v. Jewel Cos., 859 F.2d 517, 520 (7th Cir. 1988).
40. Cox, supra note 23, at 284.
41. Wilson, supra note 5, at 964.
42. 622 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1980).
43. Id. at 894 ("Certainly, every discrepancy contained in an affidavit does not justify a
district court's refusal to give credence to such evidence."). The district court
"expressly discounted the issue raised by Bone's affidavit on the ground that it was
inconsistent with his deposition testimony." Id. at 892.
44. Id. Kennett-Murray brought suit against Bone "seeking recovery on a promissory
note and an employment contract." Id. at 889. Bone argued that he was
"fraudulently induced" into signing the contract. Id. During Bone's deposition,
questions shifted "between the promissory note and the employment contract with a
degree of confusion on the parts of both Bone and the attorneys." Id. at 894. The
affidavit submitted by Bone served to explain his confusion. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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party is permitted to introduce an offsetting affidavit if he can
demonstrate he was confused by the questions during the
deposition.
4 7
A second exception to the sham affidavit doctrine was established
by the Seventh Circuit in Adelman-Tremblay v. Jewel Cos.48  The
Adelman-Tremblay court held that "[a] contradictory supplemental
affidavit is also permissible if it is based on newly discovered
evidence." 49 The evidence is not considered new if it was available
to the affiant at the time of the deposition; it must truly be evidence
discovered after the deposition was taken and unknown to the
affiant. 50  The newly-discovered evidence exception carved out by
the Adelman-Tremblay court is a generally accepted justification for
contradictions between a deposition and a subsequent affidavit. 5'
B. The Absence of Direct Supreme Court Support for the Sham
Affidavit Doctrine
The sham affidavit doctrine has not been directly addressed by the
52Supreme Court. However, "language from Justice White's
majority opinion in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby suggests that the
doctrine is consistent with the Court's modem approach toward
summary judgment." 53 The Anderson majority stated that "summary
judgment should be granted where the evidence is such that it would
47. Wilson, supra note 5, at 964, 968 n. II (citing Kennett-Murray, 622 F.2d at 894).
48. 859 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1988). Cathy Adelman-Tremblay filed suit against Jewel
Companies, Inc. and Pacific World Corp. to recover for injuries suffered from her
application of an artificial fingernails kit assembled by Pacific World and sold by a
store owned and operated by Jewel. Id. at 518. Adelman-Tremblay alleged strict
products liability. Id. The physicians who treated Adelman-Tremblay "characterized
her reaction as allergic contact dermatitis." Id. at 519. Because Adelman-Tremblay
testified in her deposition that she was "allergic to many substances," Jewel and
Pacific World moved for summary judgment, asserting they were not "liable when an
unusually susceptible consumer suffers a rare allergic reaction to a product not
- previously known to cause such a reaction." Id. Adelman-Tremblay responded by
submitting an affidavit of a doctor who characterized the cause of the injuries as "a
toxic, not an allergic, reaction to the glue." Id. During a subsequent deposition, the
doctor stated that he "no longer believed that the plaintiff suffered a toxic reaction."
Id. Adelman-Tremblay then filed a supplemental affidavit in which the doctor stated
Adelman-Tremblay was currently allergic to the glue but may not have been allergic
to it at the time of the injury. Id. The court held that because the physician's
supplemental affidavit was not based on "newly discovered evidence," it "could not
be used to create a factual issue." Id. at 520.
49. Id. at 520.
50. Cox, supra note 23, at 288-89.
51. Id. at 288.
52. See id. at 276.
53. Id. (footnote omitted).
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require a directed verdict for the moving party.",54  The Supreme
Court further noted that:
[T]he genuine issue summary judgment standard is very
close to the reasonable jury directed verdict standard: ["]The
primary difference between the two motions is procedural;
summary judgment motions are usually made before trial
and decided on documentary evidence, while directed
verdict motions are made at trial and decided on the
evidence that has been admitted.["] 55
The test for summary judgment, therefore, is "whether the evidence
presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or
whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of
law."56
At least one legal commentator has proffered that "[t]his rule
allows for the existence of the sham affidavit doctrine. If an affiant
contradicts previous deposition testimony without explanation, the
trial judge can rightly hold that a judgment in his favor would not be
reasonable. 57 This argument is persuasive when used to justify the
sham affidavit doctrine in courts that employ a flexible test for
determining whether an affidavit is a "sham." A majority of the
Federal Circuits allow district judges to strike some inconsistent
affidavits, but not all. 58 These courts recognize, in addition to the
exceptions discussed above, 59 that "not every prior inconsistency is
devastating to the credibility of a witness; there is always the
possibility that the apparent change was the product of an innocent
misunderstanding of a question, nervousness at a deposition, or
maybe a suddenly refreshed recollection. 6 °  Such a flexible sham
affidavit rule is fair because the court is looking at the party's
explanation and deciding whether a "reasonable jury" would believe
it. That is, the court determines whether the explanation offered is so
54. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986) (quoting Sartor v. Ark.
Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 624 (1944)).
55. Id. at 251 (quoting Bill Johnson's Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 745 n.11
(1983)).
56. Id. at 251-52.
57. Cox, supra note 23, at 276.
58. James Joseph Duane, The Four Greatest Myths About Summary Judgment, 52 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1523, 1598 (1995).
59. See supra Part II.A. 1.
60. Duane, supra note 58, at 1598; see also Cox, supra note 23, at 289-90 (discussing
that some federal courts have adopted a "reasonableness test" for assessing unique
explanations for contradictory affidavits).
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implausible that no reasonable jury could believe it. If it is
implausible, such that no reasonable jury would believe it, then the
affidavit should be stricken. However, the argument does not work
when a court adheres to a bright line rule, like Maryland Rule 2-
501(e), 6' that does not take into account an affiant's explanation for
an inconsistency. 62
III. MARYLAND FOLLOWS THE FEDERAL COURTS' LEAD:
MARYLAND'S ADOPTION OF THE SHAM AFFIDAVIT
RULE
Many states have followed the lead of the federal courts and now
recognize the sham affidavit doctrine. 63 In 2003, the Maryland Rules
Committee proposed an amendment to Maryland Rule 2-50164 that
encompassed the sham affidavit doctrine. 65  According to the note
following the Rules Committee's proposal, the amendment was
suggested in "respon[se] to the invitation of the Court of Appeals in
Pittman v. Atlantic Realty Co. ... for the Rules Committee to study
the issue of 'sham affidavits. ' '66 On December 8, 2003, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland ordered the Rules Committee's amendment to
Maryland's summary judgment rule to take effect on July 1, 2004.67
Maryland Rule 2-501 was amended to state:
61. See MD. R. 2-501(e).
62. See infra Part III (discussing how Maryland Rule 2-501(e) does not allow for an
affiant to explain an inconsistency; as such, the court has no basis for determining
whether a reasonable jury could find for the party).
63. See Wilson, supra note 5, at 965 n.16. The sham affidavit doctrine has not been
adopted by every state. Id. at 965. There are states that hold "that a trial court is
obliged to consider all evidence in opposition to a motion for summary judgment,
including an affidavit that contradicts a prior deposition." Id.; see also Junkins v.
Slender Woman, Inc., 386 N.E.2d 789, 790 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979) ("For purposes of
summary judgment it is sufficient that the plaintiff's later affidavit, if believed,
indicated that the contrary is true."); Delzer v. United Bank, 484 N.W.2d 502, 508
(N.D. 1992) ("There are no doubt cases where contradictions in a party's discovery
testimony will result in summary judgment because they are so extreme or farfetched
as to be unbelievable.").
64. Maryland Rule 2-501 governs motions for summary judgment. The Rule states that
"[a]ny party may make a motion for summary judgment on all or part of an action on
the ground that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." MD. R. 2-501(a).
65. 30 Md. Reg. 1125 (Aug. 22, 2003).
66. Id.
67. MD. R. 2-501; Court of Appeals of Maryland Rules Order, 30 Md. Reg. 1907-08
(Dec. 26, 2003). The Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted the amendment to Rule
2-501 that was proposed by the Court of Appeals of Maryland's Standing Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure. Id.
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(e) Contradictory Affidavit or Statement. (1) A party
may file a motion to strike an affidavit or other statement
under oath to the extent that it contradicts any prior sworn
statement of the person making the affidavit or statement.
Prior sworn statements include (A) testimony at a prior
hearing, (B) an answer to an interrogatory, and (C)
deposition testimony that has not been corrected by changes
made within the time allowed by Rule 2-415.
(2) If the court finds that the affidavit or other statement
under oath materially contradicts the prior sworn statement,
the court shall strike the contradictory part unless the court
determines that (A) the person reasonably believed the prior
statement to be true based on facts known to the person at
the time the prior statement was made, and (B) the
statement in the affidavit or other statement under oath is
based on facts that were not known to the person and could
not reasonably have been known to the person at the time
the prior statement was made or, if the prior statement was
made in a deposition, within the time allowed by Rule 2-
415(d) for correcting the deposition. 68
The 2004 Amendment allows the trial court to disregard any part of
an affidavit that contradicts a prior sworn statement. 69  The Rules
Committee and the Court of Appeals of Maryland defined a prior
sworn statement to include: "(A) testimony at a prior hearing, (B) an
answer to an interrogatory, and (C) deposition testimony that has not
been corrected by changes made within the time allowed by Rule 2-
415."70
68. MD. R. 2-501(e).
69. Id. But see Junkins v. Slender Woman, Inc., 386 N.E.2d 789, 790 (Mass. App. Ct.
1979). The Junkins court held that a party is not bound by his prior deposition
testimony. Id. "For purposes of summary judgment it is sufficient that the plaintiff's
later affidavit, if believed, indicated that the contrary is true. The conflict presents a
question of credibility, which is not to be resolved by the judge on a motion for
summary judgment." Id. (citations omitted); see also Stefan v. White, 257 N.W.2d
206, 208-09 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that a trial court must consider a
plaintiff's affidavit filed in answer to a summary judgment motion); Delzer v. United
Bank, 484 N.W.2d 502, 508 (N.D. 1992) (concluding that the trial court "must
consider the pleadings, admissions, affidavits, depositions, and interrogatories, as
well as all possible inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment").
70. MD. R. 2-501(e). Maryland Rule 2-415(d) allows the deponent to make form or
substance changes to his or her deposition within thirty days after receiving the
deposition transcript. MD. R. 2-415(d). The deponent must note why each change is
being made. Id. Rule 2-415 was amended, effective July 1, 2004, to allow a
20081
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Maryland's sham affidavit rule, Rule 2-501(e), gives the trial court
broad power to strike contradictory parts of an affidavit submitted in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment. 71 There is only one
exception to Maryland's sham affidavit rule. 72  The contradictory
affidavit may not be disregarded if the affiant "reasonably believed
the prior statement to be true based on the facts known" and the
statement made in the affidavit is "based on facts that were not
known... and could not reasonably have been known to the [affiant]
at the time [of] the prior statement., 73 This exception is analogous to
the federal "newly discovered evidence" exception discussed in
Adelman-Tremblay v. Jewel Cos.7 4 The Maryland Rules Committee
did not suggest, and the Court of Appeals of Maryland did not
require, the inclusion of the federally recognized exception that
allows a contradictory affidavit to be submitted if the affiant was
confused by the questions during his or her deposition. 75
Additionally, the amendment to Rule 2-501 does not allow for
unique explanations of contradictions in subsequent affidavits.
76
Some federal courts disagree on their treatment of situations in which
a party offers a "unique explanation for contradictions" between his
deposition and subsequent affidavits. 77  One way to handle unique
explanations is to take them on a case-by-case basis and determine
whether the contradiction is "reasonably justified., 78  The
reasonableness test recognizes there are many conceivable
justifications for why a party's subsequent affidavit contradicts their
deposition testimony and allows the court to "evaluate each excuse
for contradiction on its own merits."7 9 However, Maryland Rule 2-
501(e) does not take into account unique explanations for
deponent to make substantive changes, rather than just corrections, to his deposition.
Court of Appeals of Maryland Rules Order, 30 Md. Reg. 1906-07 (Dec. 26, 2003).
71. MD. R. 2-501(e).
72. Id. at 2-501(e)(2).
73. Id.
74. Compare Adelman-Tremblay v. Jewel Cos., 859 F.2d 517, 520 (7th Cir. 1988) with
MD. R. 2-501(e)(2).
75. Compare Kennett-Murray Corp. v. Bone, 622 F.2d 887, 894 (5th Cir. 1980) and
Wilson, supra note 5, at 964, with Court of Appeals of Maryland Rules Order, 30
Md. Reg. 1908 (Dec. 26, 2003).and MD. R. 2-501(e).
76. See MD. R. 2-501(e)(2).
77. Cox, supra note 23, at 289-90.
78. Id. There are also federal courts that reject any alternative excuses for contradictions.
Id. That is, contradictions not based on new evidence or contradictions due to
confusion at the deposition. See id.
79. Id. at 290.
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contradictions; the rule allows the court to rely on contradictory
affidavits only when the contradiction is based on new evidence.
80
IV. WHY THE SHAM AFFIDAVIT DOCTRINE: RATIONALE
FOR THE SHAM AFFIDAVIT DOCTRINE
The objective of summary judgment is to distinguish "real and
genuine issues" of fact from those that are false. 81 The argument in
support of the sham affidavit doctrine is that an affidavit submitted in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment, and that contradicts
the affiant's prior sworn statements, does not create a genuine issue
of fact.82 It is argued that contradictory affidavits are precluded "by
the affiant's unambiguous deposition admissions."83 "[W]hen parties
admit in a deposition to certain conduct, they place the material facts
of a case out of dispute, and a transparent subsequent denial of such
admissions should not be considered., 84 The crux of the argument is
that in the absence of the sham affidavit doctrine, parties would have
an incentive to submit fraudulent affidavits in an effort to force a
settlement.85 Courts that have adopted the sham affidavit doctrine
believe that "if litigants could, without penalty, offer affidavits that
contradict previous testimony, summary judgment would be
eviscerated.,
8 6
The Perma court discussed three justifications87  for the
establishment of the sham affidavit doctrine, the basis for Maryland
Rule 2-501(e).88 First, the Perma court relied on Moore's Federal
Practice for the proposition that deposition testimony is more reliable
than an affidavit because deposition testimony is subject to cross
80. MD. R. 2-501 (e)(2).
81. Radobenko v. Automated Equip. Corp., 520 F.2d 540, 544 (9th Cir. 1975).
82. See Cox, supra note 23, at 279.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 268; see also Buckner v. Sam's Club, Inc., 75 F.3d 290, 293 (7th Cir. 1996)
("The concern in litigation ... is that a party will first admit no knowledge of a fact
but will later come up with a specific recollection that would override the earlier
admission.").
87. Perma Research & Dev. Co. v. Singer Co., 410 F.2d 572 (1969); Pittman v. Atl.
Realty Co., 359 Md. 513, 529, 754 A.2d 1030, 1038 (2000).
88. Compare Perma, 410 F.2d 572 (holding that an affidavit that contradicts prior
deposition testimony can be disregarded when deciding a motion for summary
judgment), with MD. R. 2-501(e) (stating that a trial court can disregard an affidavit
that materially contradicts prior sworn statements in considering a motion for
summary judgment).
20081
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examination. 89  This has been referred to as the "reliability"
justification for the sham affidavit doctrine. 90  The second
justification set forth by the Perma court is that disregarding
contradictory affidavits ensures that "the utility of summary judgment
as a procedure for screening out sham issues of fact" is not
defeated. 9' This is described as the "utility" justification for the
sham affidavit doctrine. 92 Lastly, the Perma court held that it would
be unfair to allow a party to generate a dispute of material fact
through "inconsistent statements made by [that party] the deponent
and [that party] the affiant. ' ' 93 Although the Perma court "did not
use the word fairness" 94 to describe the third rationale, it is often
referred to as the fairness justification for the sham affidavit
doctrine. 95 The next part of this Comment will address an inherent
problem with Rule 2-501(e), and then will address each of the
justifications for the sham affidavit rule.96 Furthermore, it will show
how reliability, utility, and fairness can each be attained without
Maryland Rule 2-501(e). 97
V. WHY MARYLAND SHOULD ABANDON THE SHAM
AFFIDAVIT RULE: THERE ARE LESS RESTRICTIVE
MEANS AVAILABLE FOR DEALING WITH SHAM
AFFIDAVITS
A. An Inherent Problem with Maryland's Current Sham Affidavit
Rule
1. The Right to Have a Jury Decide Factual Issues in Civil
Proceedings
"The right to a trial by jury is deeply embedded in the American
democratic ethos." 98 The right to a trial by jury is guaranteed by the
89. 410 F.2d at 578 ("The deposition of a witness will usually be more reliable than his
affidavit, since the deponent was either cross-examined by opposing counsel, or at
least available to opposing counsel for cross examination.") (quoting 6 JAMES WM.
MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE T 56.22[1] at 2814 (2d ed. 1965));
accord Pittman, 359 Md. at 529, 754 A.2d at 1038.
90. Holley, supra note 12, at 880.
91. 410 F.2d at 578; accord Pittman, 359 Md. at 529, 754 A.2d at 1038.
92. Pittman, 359 Md. at 529, 754 A.2d at 1038; Holley, supra note 12, at 880.
93. Pittman, 359 Md. at 529, 754 A.2d at 1038 (quoting Perma, 410 F.2d at 578).
94. Pittman, 359 Md. at 529, 754 A.2d at 1038.
95. Holley, supra note 12, at 881 (noting the Perma court's fair play rationale).
96. See infra Part V.
97. See infra Part V.
98. VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 31 (1986).
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U.S. Constitution, 99 as well as in every state constitution. t°°  The
Constitution of Maryland guarantees "[t]he right [to a] trial by Jury of
all issues of fact in civil proceedings ... where the amount in
controversy exceeds the sum of $10,000. '"101 The Court of Appeals
of Maryland has held that "like the [S]eventh [A]mendment to the
Constitution of the United States, [the Constitution of Maryland]
requires that enjoyment of the right. . . be not obstructed, and that the
ultimate determination of issues of fact by the jury be not interfered
with." 102
In a jury trial, the jury has the responsibility of finding facts and
settling disputes of facts. It is the "province of the jury to decide
or determine the facts of the case from the evidence adduced and to
render a verdict in accordance with the instructions given by the
court."' 1 4 It is the jury's duty to "weigh[] the evidence, judg[e] the
credibility of witnesses, and reach[] a verdict."' 1 5  "The right to
determine the credibility of witnesses is at the core of the jury's fact-
finding function."' 1 6  Maryland's sham affidavit rule encroaches on
the jury's fact-finding domain by allowing the trial judge to make a
credibility determination. 1
07
99. The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right to a
jury trial. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The Seventh Amendment states:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law.
100. HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 98, at 31.
101. MD. CONST. art. 23 (emphasis added).
102. State v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 291, 385 A.2d 57, 67 (1978) (quoting In re Peterson,
253 U.S. 300, 310 (1920)), overruled on other grounds, Newell v. Richards, 323 Md.
717, 594 A.2d 1152 (1991).
103. CHARLES W. JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY 16 (Greenwood Press 1972)
(1962); SIR PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 61 (1988) (1956) ("'T[he] facts are for
you and the law is for me.' That is the theme which with variations will be found at
or near the beginning of every charge to a jury."); Holley, supra note 12, at 865
("Judges decide questions of law, while juries decide questions of fact.").
104. 47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury § 2 (2006).
105. Id. (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 625 (1991)).
106. Holley, supra note 12, at 875 (quoting 9A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2527 (2d ed. 1995)).
107. See infra Part V.A.2.
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2. Function of Summary Judgment
A motion for summary judgment is governed by Maryland Rule 2-
501, which states that a motion for summary judgment may be filed
"on the ground that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."' 108 The
Court of Appeals of Maryland held that "[s]ummary judgment is not
a substitute for trial. Stated differently, its purpose is not to try the
case or resolve factual disputes."' 1 9 The court's role in deciding a
motion for summary judgment does not include weighing the
evidence." 1 0 Instead, the role of the court in deciding a motion for
summary judgment is to determine whether there is a genuine factual
dispute. 
,
It has been held in Maryland that "[cjredibility is not an issue to be
determined on summary judgment. ' ' l 2 Allowing a trial judge to
disregard an inconsistent affidavit on the ground that the affiant's
deposition testimony is more reliable enables the trial judge to make
a credibility determination. This deprives the affiant of the right to
have a jury decide questions of fact. The judge is essentially saying
the affiant is lying because her affidavit is inconsistent with her
deposition testimony. Rule 2-501(e) allows the trial judge to answer
the question: Is the party's statement in the affidavit a lie, or was the
party able to relate her recollection with greater clarity than she was
able to at her deposition?' 1 3 Only a juy can make that determination
because it is a question of credibility.
108. MD. R. 2-501(a); accord Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Benjamin, 394 Md. 59, 73, 904
A.2d 511,519 (2006).
109. Goodwich v. Sinai Hosp. of Bait., 343 Md. 185, 205-06, 680 A.2d 1067, 1077
(1996).
110. Id. at 206, 680 A.2d at 1077-78.
111. Fishman Constr. Co. v. Hansen, 238 Md. 418, 421-22, 209 A.2d 605, 607 (1965).
112. -Coffey v. Derby Steel Co., 291 Md. 241, 247, 434 A.2d 564, 568 (1981); accord
Berkey v. Delia, 287 Md. 302, 326, 413 A.2d 170, 181-82 (1980) (stating that
credibility is not decided on summary judgment); Wolfe v. Lamar & Wallace, Inc.,
261 Md. 174, 274 A.2d 121 (1971) ("The court does not attempt to decide any issue
of fact or of credibility, but only whether such issues exist." (quoting Strickler Eng'g.
Corp. v. Seminar, Inc., 210 Md. 93, 100, 122 A.2d 563, 567 (1956)); Whalen v.
Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 164 Md. App. 292, 306, 883 A.2d 228, 237
(2005) (holding that the trial court may not determine the credibilityiof witnesses
when deciding a motion for summary judgment), rev'd on other grounds, 395 Md.
154, 909 A.2d 683 (2006).
113. See Anthony's Pier Four, Inc. v. Crandall Dry Dock Eng'rs, Inc., 489 N.E.2d 172,
178 (Mass. 1986) (holding that an affidavit that conflicts with deposition testimony
may be the result of being able to recollect the facts with greater clarity).
114. See Coffey, 291 Md. at 247, 434 A.2d at 568.
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The Court of Appeals of Maryland held in Berkey v. Delia115 "that
credibility is not an issue to be decided on summary judgment."' 16
"The function of the summary judgment procedure is not to try the
case or to decide issues of fact. It is merely to determine whether
there is an issue of fact to be tried, and if there is none, to cause
judgment to be rendered accordingly." 117 As recently as 2005, the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that "the trial court may
not determine the credibility of witnesses" in deciding whether to
grant a motion for summary judgment. 118 Maryland Rule 2-501(e),
the sham affidavit rule, gives the court the ability to determine the
credibility of the affiant. According to the Court of Appeals of
Maryland, "[t]he sham affidavit rule is contrary to the way in which
this Court's rule on summary judgment traditionally has been
applied, because, in application, the sham affidavit rule requires a
credibility judgment by the trial court."'1 9  The sham affidavit
doctrine enables the court to strip the party opposing a motion for
summary judgment of their right to have a jury determine all issues of
fact. One legal commentator has said, "the sham doctrine is, for all
practical purposes, making precisely the same credibility
determination that the credibility rule prohibits. That is, the sham
doctrine explicitly permits courts to exercise apparently forbidden
discretion." ' 20
a. The credibility rule and Maryland's unconstitutional violation of
it with Rule 2-501 (e)
Maryland courts adhere to the credibility rule when deciding a
motion for summary judgment. 121 The credibility rule requires that a
jury, not a judge, make credibility determinations.'2 2  Legal
commentator Michael Holley has stated:
115. 287 Md. 302, 413 A.2d 170.
116. Id. at 326, 413 A.2d at 181-82.
117. Id. at 326, 413 A.2d at 181 (quoting Tellez v. Canton R.R., 212 Md. 423, 430, 129
A.2d 809, 813 (1957)).
118. Whalen, 164 Md. App. at 306, 883 A.2d at 237.
119. Pittman v. Atil. Realty Co., 359 Md. 513, 534, 754 A.2d 1030, 1041 (2000).
120. Holley, supra note 12, at 887.
121. See discussion supra Part V.A.1-2 (discussing that a jury makes findings of fact);
Coffey v. Derby Steel Co., 291 Md. 241, 247, 434 A.2d 564, 568 (1981) (holding
that credibility is not an issue for summary judgment because the judge makes no
findings of fact).
122. Holley, supra note 12, at 873.
20081
Baltimore Law Review
Because the existence of a falsehood in testimony is a
question of fact, only jurors, who have looked the witness in
the face, can disregard personal testimony as dishonest.
Consequently, the judge generally cannot disregard personal
testimony on credibility grounds after simply reading the
witness' [sic] affidavit at the summary judgment stage. This
is the "credibility rule."' 23
The purpose of the credibility rule is to "prevent a judge from using
his discretion over the outcome of a plaintiffs case, rather than to
simply facilitate adjudication."' 124 Holley has proffered that the core
rationale supporting the credibility rule is that by allowing the jury to
make credibility determinations, it ensures the legitimacy of the
judgment. 125  The argument is that the jury deliberates and then
decides who is lying. 126 Subsequently, no questions can be asked as
to how the jury made its determination; therefore, "the parties are
forced to live with the jury's conclusions . ,,"27 "This method does
not guarantee, or even hardly encourage, accurate results, but the
prevailing belief is that it protects the legitimacy of judgments
because it at least 'hides the source of any inaccuracy from the
public's gaze.""
2 8
Although Holley's argument is persuasive, the most significant
rationale for the credibility rule is the constitutional rationale-
without the credibility rule, the jury cannot adequately judge the law
and the facts. 12 9 Credibility is a question of fact for the jury,' 30 and
the Constitution of Maryland Preserves the right to have a jury
determine all questions of fact.' The only way that a sham affidavit
rule can be constitutional-not in violation of the credibility rule-is
if the rule is severely limited. The standard for striking an
inconsistent affidavit must require that no "reasonable jury"'1 32 would
rely on the testimony; therefore, the person is incredible as a matter
of law.
123. Id. at 865.
124. Id. at 873.
125. Id. at 876.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 876-77 (quoting in part George Fisher, The Jury's Rise as Lie Detector, 107
YALE L.J. 575,578-79 (1997)) (footnote omitted).
129. See MD. CONST. art. 23.
130. Holley, supra note 12, at 875; see also supra note 112 and accompanying text.
131. See MD. CONST. art. 23.
132. See discussion infra Part V.B. (discussing how the test for deciding a motion for
summary judgment is analogous to the reasonable jury test used for deciding a
motion for judgment).
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Testimony is incredible as a matter of law if it "attempts to
establish something physically impossible within common
knowledge and experience, or something contrary to the laws of
nature or indisputable scientific principles within the court's judicial
knowledge."' 133 The Court of Appeals of Maryland has held that the
test to determine whether a party's testimony is incredible as a matter
of law is whether the "undisputed ... facts ... demonstrate that the
evidence is false beyond a reasonable doubt."' 34  If the testimony
given in an affidavit is found to be incredible as a matter of law then
there is no longer a jury question, and the judge may disregard the
affidavit in deciding a motion for summary judgment. 135 Maryland
Rule 2-501(e), in its current form, circumvents the credibility rule;
therefore, it is unconstitutional.
Maryland Rule 2-501(e) does not require that an affidavit be
incredible as a matter of law before being stricken. 136 Rule 2-501(e)
does not enable the affiant to explain the inconsistency; therefore, the
trial judge has no way of determining whether the affidavit is
incredible as a matter of law. Rather, Rule 2-501(e) allows an
affidavit to be stricken if it contradicts prior sworn testimony and the
contradiction is not based on new information unknown at the time of
the prior sworn statement.' 37 The standard utilized in Rule 2-501(e)
allows the trial judge to make credibility determinations,' 38 a
function reserved for the Ijury through the credibility rule and the
Constitution of Maryland. 9 Maryland's sham affidavit rule invites
the trial judge to abrogate the right to a jury trial on the issue of
credibility; therefore, the rule violates Maryland's constitutionally
guaranteed right to have a jury decide questions of fact. 140 Maryland
Rule 2-501(e) could be amended to conform to the Constitution of
133. Campbell v. Dix, 203 Md. 338, 345, 100 A.2d 798, 802 (1953); see Holley, supra
note 12, at 875 ("The only exception [to the credibility rule] seems to be where the
plaintiffs testimony defies the laws of physics.").
134. York Motor Express Co. v. State, 195 Md. 525, 535, 74 A.2d 12, 16 -(1950);
Campbell, 203 Md. at 345, 100 A.2d at 802; see also Pittman v. Atl. Realty Co., 359
Md. 513, 539, 754 A.2d 1030, 1044 (2000) ("Reasonable persons, based on their real
life experiences, may not be persuaded that Hall's failure to be consistent in dealing
with the length of periods of time and when they began means that the testimony
most favorable to the Petitioners cannot be believed.").
135. York, 195 Md. at 534, 74 A.2d at 16.
136. See MD. R. 2-501(e).
137. Id.
138. See supra Part V.A.2 (discussing how Rule 2-501(e) allows the trial judge to make a
credibility determination at the summary judgment stage).
139. See supra Part V.A. 1-2.
140. MD. CONST. art. 23.
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Maryland, but the justifications for the sham affidavit rule can each
be achieved in a less restrictive way.'
4
'
B. Questions of Reliability Caused by Inconsistencies in a Party's
Testimony Should be Addressed on Cross-Examination Before a
Jury
Perma's "reliability" justification for the sham affidavit doctrine is
based on the assertion that deposition testimony is more reliable than
an affidavit because deposition testimony is subject to cross
examination. 142  However, the remainder of the passage relied on
from Moore's Federal Practice goes on to state: "[I]f a witness has
made an affidavit and his deposition has also been taken, and the two
in some way conflict, the court may not exclude the affidavit from
consideration in the determination of the question whether there is
any genuine issue as to any material fact."' 143  Nevertheless, the
Perma court held that the trial court "could properly conclude that the
statement made in the affidavit was less reliable than the
contradictory statements in the deposition, . . . and that it did not raise
a triable issue of fraud." 144
The reliability justification discussed by the Perma court is
undercut by the argument that the sham affidavit rule "shift[s] the
credibility determination from the trier of fact at trial, where the trier
of fact would have the benefit of observing the witness's demeanor
on cross-examination, to the trial court on summaryjudgment, where
the trial court would be limited to a paper record." 1 5 Proponents of
the sham affidavit rule argue that "sham affidavits do not introduce
issues of credibility, because they are precluded from consideration
by the affiant's unambiguous deposition admissions."'' 46  This
argument is inconsistent because, although it is true that a sham
affidavit cannot create a genuine dispute, the only way to determine
that an affidavit is a sham is to weigh the affiant's credibility. 14  The
fact finder should be allowed to determine which version of the facts
to believe. 148  There are some inconsistent affidavits that are not
141. See infra Parts V.B-C.
142. Perma Research & Dev. Co. v. Singer Co., 410 F.2d 572, 578 (2d Cir. 1969) (quoting
6 MOORE, supra note 89, at 2814).
143. Id. (quoting 6 MOORE, supra note 89, at 2814).
144. Id. at 577 (citing 6 MOORE, supra note 89, at 2814).
145. Pittman v. Atl. Realty Co., 359 Md. 513, 540, 754 A.2d 1030, 1045 (2000); see supra
Part V.A. (discussing how shifting the credibility determination is unconstitutional).
146. Cox, supra note 23, at 279.
147. See Duane, supra note 58, at 1599-1600.
148. See Anthony's Pier Four, Inc. v. Crandall Dry Dock Eng'rs, Inc., 489 N.E.2d 172,
178 (Mass. 1986).
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fraudulent; 49 yet Rule 2-501(e) directs the court to "strike the
contradictory part" of any affidavit, not falling within the one
exception, 150 that "materially contradicts the prior sworn
statement"-in essence, classifying the affidavit as a sham. 151
In an attempt to narrow the sham affidavit doctrine the Eleventh
Circuit held:
To allow every failure of memory or variation in a witness's
testimony to be disregarded as a sham would require far too
much from lay witnesses and would deprive the trier of fact
of the traditional opportunity to determine which point in
time and with which words the witness (in this case, the
affiant) was stating the truth. Variations in a witness's
testimony and any failure of memory throughout the course
of discovery create an issue of credibility as to which part of
the testimony should be given the greatest weight if credited
at all. 15
2
A sham affidavit is an "act of desperation";' 53 therefore, the
inconsistency in the party's statements should be brought up during
cross-examination to attack the party's credibility.' 54 If the evidence
presented in the affidavit is rejected by the trier of facts and the judge
is convinced the affidavit is a sham, then the affiant and their attorney
can face severe sanctions. 155
C. The Utility Function of the Summary Judgment Procedure, as a
Process for Screening Out Sham Claims, Will Not Be Defeated
in the Absence of Maryland Rule 2-501 (e)
The purpose of summary judgment "is not to try the case or resolve
factual disputes. Rather, the procedure is designed to determine
whether a factual controversy exists requiring a trial."' 156  In
149. Cox, supra note 23, at 280.
150. MD. R. 2-501(e)(2).
151. Id.
152. Tippens v. Celotex Corp., 805 F.2d 949, 953-54 (11 th Cir. 1986).
153. Pittman v. At. Realty Co., 359 Md. 513, 541, 754 A.2d 1030, 1045 (2000).
154. Id. ("[T]he principal deterrent to the sham affidavit is its substantial undermining of
the credibility of the nonmovant when testifying at trial and the increased risk to the
nonmovant of losing the case on the merits.").
155. See Pittman, 359 Md. at 542-43, 754 A.2d at 1045-46; see also infra Part V.D. 1.a-b.
156. Goodwich v. Sinai Hosp. of Bait., 343 Md. 185, 205-06, 680 A.2d 1067, 1077
(1996) (citations omitted); see also Sadler v. Dimensions Healthcare Corp., 378 Md.
509, 534, 836 A.2d 655, 669-70 (2003) ("[Tjhe purpose of the summary judgment
procedure is not to try the case or to decide the factual disputes, but to decide
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Maryland, to prevent the entry of a motion for summary judgment,
the nonmoving party must present evidence that "'would allow a
reasonable fact-finder to conclude' that, in actuality, the facts were
those most favorable to the nonmovant." 157  The judge should
essentially ask:
Assuming that all of the witnesses would testify at a trial
just as they have in their most recent affidavits, that they are
cross-examined about the allegedly inconsistent statements
they made at their depositions, and that the jury hears the
same explanation.., given (if any) about the variation, is
there any genuine possibility that the jury might find in
favor of the adverse party? 
158
One legal commentator wrote, "a factual question will not reach a
jury 'merely because some evidence has been introduced by the party
having the burden of proof, unless the evidence be of such character
that it would warrant the jury in finding a verdict in favor of that
party."' 1 59 Accordingly, Maryland courts are presently authorized to
disregard content of an affidavit that is so implausible that no
reasonable' 60 jury would believe the statements.' 6  This allows the
courts to keep truly sham affidavits out while allowing the
questionable affidavits to go to the jury. This method safeguards the
whether there is an issue of fact, which is sufficiently material to be tried." (quoting
Taylor v. NationsBank, N.A., 365 Md. 166, 173, 776 A.2d 645, 650 (2001); Jones v.
Mid-Atlantic, 362 Md. 661, 675, 766 A.2d 617, 624 (2001))).
157. Pittman, 359 Md. 513, 538, 754 A.2d 1030, 1043 (quoting Chesapeake Publ'g Corp.
v. Williams, 339 Md. 285, 299, 661 A.2d 1169, 1176 (1995)); see also Beatty v.
Trailmaster Prods., Inc., 330 Md. 726, 739, 625 A.2d 1005, 1011 (1993) ("[T]here
must be evidence upon which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff").
158. Duane, supra note 58, at 1604.
159. Id. at 1582 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986)).
160. The Pittman opinion uses the phrases "rational jury," "rational jury," "reasonable
fact-finder," and "reasonable persons" interchangeably to describe the test used by
Maryland courts to adjudicate a motion for summary judgment. Pittman, 359 Md. at
538-39, 754 A.2d at 1043-44. The phrase rational jury, however, can have a
different connotation than the phrase reasonable jury, which is the correct description
of Maryland's test. See id. at 537-38, 754 A.2d at 1043. It must be inferred that,
when the court uses the phrase rational jury, it means reasonable jury, because the
court states that the test for deciding a motion for summary judgment is analogous to
the reasonable jury test used for deciding a motion for judgment. Id. at 537, 539, 754
A.2d 1043, 1044.
161. Id. at 538, 754 A.2d at 1044; see also Duane, supra note 58, at 1581. ("[T]here are
certain basic claims that witnesses might make that are not provably false but are so
wildly implausible and unbelievable that no rational jury would be allowed to return
a verdict on the basis of such testimony.").
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"role of the jury as arbiters of disputable factual issues" while still
allowing "the judge to weed out those truly sham affidavits that have
no possibility of being accepted by any jury."' 62
It has been argued that the reasonable jury test for ruling on a
motion for summary judgment provides direct support for the sham
affidavit doctrine.' If an affidavit contradicts previous testimony
without an explanation, then it would be unreasonable for a judge or
jury to believe the affidavit or make a finding based on it. 64 This
argument, however, cannot be used to justify Maryland's sham
affidavit rule because Maryland adopted a bright line rule on
contradictory affidavits.' 65  Maryland Rule 2-501(e)(2) states the
court "shall strike" contradictory parts of an affidavit unless the
contradiction is based on new evidence unknown at the time of the
prior sworn statement.' 66 Maryland's Rule, in its current form, does
not allow a party filing a contradictory affidavit to offer an
explanation for the inconsistency.167 Rule 2-501(e)(2) does not allow
the party to submit an explanation; therefore the judge has no wax, of
determining whether a "reasonable jury" could find for the party.
Were the courts to disregard Maryland's inflexible sham affidavit
rule, the reasonable jury test, discussed in Pittman v. Atlantic Realty
Co., 169 could screen out sham claims at the summary judgment stage
of litigation. The trial judge, when faced with an affidavit that
contradicts a prior sworn statement, could listen to the party's
explanation and determine whether a reasonable jury could find for
that party. ' 70 This approach would ensure that the utility function of
the summary judgment procedure,' 71 as a process for screening out
sham claims, is not defeated, while also ensuring that a jury decides
reasonably disputed facts.
162. Duane, supra note 58, at 1604.
163. See supra Part I.B.
164. Cox, supra note 23, at 276.
165. Pittman, 359 Md. at 547-48, 754 A.2d at 1049.
166. MD. R. 2-501(e)(2).
167. Pittman, 359 Md. at 547-48, 754 A.2d at 1049.
168. Id. at 539, 754 A.2d at 1044.
169. 359 Md. 513, 538, 754 A.2d 1030, 1043 (2000).
170. Id. at 538, 754 A.2d at 1044; Duane, supra note 58, at 1581.
171. Perma Research & Dev. Co. v. Singer Co., 410 F.2d 572, 578 (1969); accord
Pittman, 359 Md. at 529, 754 A.2d at 1038.
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D. It is Not Unfair to Allow a Party to Submit an Affidavit In
Opposition to a Motion for Summary Judgment, Which
Contradicts Prior Sworn Deposition Testimony.
1. Pittman v. Atlantic Realty Co. 172
Prior to Maryland's adoption of Rule 2-501(e), Pittman was the
leading Maryland case on the sham affidavit doctrine. The central
issue in Pittman was "whether a trial court has discretion to strike
affidavits, submitted in response to a motion for summary
judgment... when the factual content of those affidavits varies from
what the nonmoving party previously had furnished in discovery."1
73
Sheri Hall filed suit against Atlantic Reality Company on behalf of
her minor child, Terran Pittman. 174  Hall alleged that Pittman
suffered injury due to exposure to lead paint at the premises owned
by Atlantic Realty. 175 The main factual issue in the Pittman case was
the amount of time Pittman spent at the subject property. 176 In her
Answers to Interrogatories, Hall stated she and her son moved into
the premises in the spring or summer of 1992.177 Hall further stated
that Pittman was cared for at the premises "during the hours of 8:00
a.m. through 4:00 p.m., Monday through Friday."r 8 However, at her
deposition, "Hall's answers concerning how long she and Terran
resided... at the subject premises, and how often she visited there
with Terran, were vague, confused, and inconsistent."' 79 During her
deposition, Hall gave the following measures of time her son spent at
the subject premises:
"[a]bout a month"; "[a]bout two weeks. Two months I
mean"; "[flor about two months"; for a time "in the fall,
probably"; for a time beginning when her son "was two...
[o]r getting ready to turn two. It was somewhere around
that area"; for a time ending "close to a holiday because I
had to buy [Terran] an outfit.... It might have been Easter
or the Fourth of July. I'm trying to think. Because it was
spring when I was around there. Easter is in the spring,
172. 359 Md. 513, 754 A.2d 1030.
173. Id. at 517, 754 A.2d at 1032.
174. Id. at 517-18, 754 A.2d at 1032.
175. Id. at 518, 754 A.2d at 1032.
176. Id. at 519, 754 A.2d at 1033; see also Jeffrey S. Gauges, Recent Development,
Pittman v. Atlantic Realty Co.: The Court of Appeals of Maryland Refuses to Adopt
the Federal "Sham "Affidavit Rule, 7 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 176, 176 (2000).
177. Pittman, 359 Md. at 519, 754 A.2d at 1033.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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right? Right"; for a time beginning "before [Terran's]
birthday [in December 1992]"; for a time comprising
"January, February [1993], because it wasn't too bad
outside"; "[a]bout two months"; "about two months,
because I know how many times I gave [Porter] some
money for rent money." Finally, in response to the question
whether "two months is the maximum that you lived with
[Porter]," Hall answered, "Right, yes. 18°
The only, arguably, definitive answer Hall gave during her
deposition was that she and her son lived at the subject premises for
two months. 181 However, it could also be inferred that they lived at
the subject premises from December 1992 until Easter 1993.182
Furthermore, Hall's deposition testimony with respect to visiting the
subject premises differed from her answers to interrogatories.' The
best possible inference that can be made from Hall's deposition is
that Terran "visited the subject premises twice a week before residing
there and three to four times a week for up to three hours at a time
after residing there." 1
84
In response to Atlantic Realty's motion for summary judgment,
Hall submitted an affidavit which varied from her deposition and her
answers to interrogatories. 185 Hall stated in her affidavit that she and
her son visited the subject property seven to eight hours everyday,
and that they lived in the subject premises for five and half
months. 186 Hall offered no explanation for the variances from the
prior evidence given. 187
Even though faced with an inconsistent affidavit,'88 the Court of
Appeals of Maryland refused to adopt the federal sham affidavit
180. Id. at 519-20, 754 A.2d at 1033 (alterations in original).
181. Id. at 520, 754 A.2d at 1033.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 520-21, 754 A.2d at 1034. Hall testified that "'here and there, [Porter] baby-
s[a]t [Terran]'; '[Porter] lived right around the comer from us, so I would stop in
there quite often .... [P]robably like twice out of a week or something like that, out
of a month, who knows. I'd just drop in, you know."' Id. (alterations in original).
184. Id. at 521, 754 A.2d at 1034.
185. Id. at 523-24, 754 A.2d at 1035.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 524, 754 A.2d at 1036.
188. Given the back and forth nature of Hall's testimony, it could be argued that Hall's
affidavit is an example of testimony that is incredible as a matter of law. The
Pittman Court, however, stated reasonable persons could believe Hall's testimony
despite the inconsistencies. Id. at 539, 754 A.2d at 1044.
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doctrine. 189  In refusing to adopt the sham affidavit doctrine, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland identified several methods in which
the trial court could deal with inconsistent affidavits, other than
striking the affidavit. 190  Each of the methods discussed by the
Pittman court ensures fairness for the party opposing the affidavit.' 
91
Furthermore, each of the methods discussed serves to prevent some
of the obvious problems caused by sham affidavits, 192 i.e., cluttering
up the courts, increasing the cost of litigation, and causing emotional
exhaustion of the parties. 193
a. Perjury
If the trial court believes a knowingly false affidavit has been filed,
they may "refer the matter to the prosecutor for possible perjury
charges."19 4  Maryland Code, Criminal Law, § 9-101(a) states that
"[a] person may not willfully and falsely make an oath or affirmation
as to a material fact ... in an affidavit made to induce a court or
officer to pass an account or claim; . . . Lor] in an affidavit or
affirmation made under the Maryland Rules."
189. Id. One concern the Pittman court had about the sham affidavit rule was that if it
was adopted:
[11n order to address what may be a relatively small number of cases in
which sham affidavits are presented, the downside possibly would be an
increase in the filings of summary judgment motions that are based on an
attempt to convince the trial court that some variation in the nonmovant's
affidavit was completely and inexplicably contradictory, and that the
variation was not simply a clarification or elaboration.
Id. at 541-42, 754 A.2d at 1045.
190. Id. at 542-43, 754 A.2d at 1045-46.
191. See id.
192. The three methods discussed by the Pittman court and addressed in this Comment are
not the only methods available to a trial judge to deal with a sham affidavit, other
than striking it. See Duane, supra note 58, at 1605-10. The argument has been made
that the power of the trial judge to grant a new trial may serve as an effective method
of dealing with sham affidavits without striking thcm completely. Id. at 1609-10.
However, granting a new trial may present an excessively long process for dealing
with a plaintiff who offers testimony that is inconsistent with her deposition. See id.
Additionally, a new trial does not attack the problems caused by sham affidavits;
instead, a new trial exacerbates the problems. See id. A new trial is essentially a
redo; the court must rehear the case, the parties must pay for a new trial, and the
lawyers must endure the emotional cost of a new trial.
193. See Pittman, 359 Md. at 542-43, 754 A.2d at 1045-46; see also Duane, supra note
58, at 1610-11 (discussing problems caused by sham affidavits).
194. Pittman, 359 Md. at 542, 754 A.2d at 1045.
195. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 9-101 (a)(3),(5) (LexisNexis Supp. 2007).
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Section 9-101(b) of the Maryland Code makes filing a false
affidavit a misdemeanor crime, punishable by up to ten years in
prison. 196 Although Maryland courts have been reluctant to enforce
the crime of perjury upon those filing sham affidavits in civil
cases, 197 the courts have the power to charge parties filing sham
affidavits with perjury.1 98  If trial courts became more willing to
enforce section 9-101 of the Maryland Code, 199 the threat of
imprisonment would be an adequate deterrent to the filing of sham
affidavits.200
If the trial court is faced with a truly sham affidavit, which was
filed only to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the court can
recommend that the affiant be brought up on perjury charges. 20 1
Section 9-101 of the Maryland Code, perjury, ensures that a party
submitting an inconsistent affidavit does not gain an unfair advantage
over their opponent by imposing a penalty for the submission of a
knowingly false affidavit. The power of the trial judge to
recommend perjury charges could serve to prevent most problems
caused by sham affidavits because the threat of being charged with
perjury would eliminate the filing of such affidavits.
b. Bad faith defense
In the absence of the sham affidavit rule, if, at trial, the fact finder
(usually a jury) rejects the facts set forth in the affidavit, and "the
court is convinced that the affidavit was a sham, designed merely to
forestall summary judgment and to prolong the possibility of
effecting some settlement," then the offending party may be subject
to sanctions under Maryland Rule 1-341. 204 Maryland Rule 1-341
imposes sanctions upon a party who makes a defense in bad faith.205
Maryland Rule 1-341 states:
196. Id. § 9-101(b).
197. As of this writing, March 17, 2008, a search of reported Maryland perjury opinions
returned no result for a conviction stemming from a sham affidavit submitted in a
civil case.
198. CRIM. LAW § 9-101(b).
199. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
201. Pittman, 359 Md. at 542, 754 A.2d at 1045.
202. CRIM. LAW § 9-101(b).
203. Id.
204. Pittman, 359 Md. at 542-43, 754 A.2d at 1046.
205. MD. R. 1-341.
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In any civil action, if the court finds that the conduct of
any party in maintaining or defending any proceeding was
in bad faith or without substantial justification the court may
require the offending party or the attorney advising the
conduct or both of them to pay to the adverse party the costs
of the proceeding and the reasonable expenses, including
reasonable attorney's fees, incurred by the adverse party in
opposing it.
20 6
The language of Rule 1-341 eliminates the need for the sham
207affidavit doctrine. If an affidavit, submitted in opposition to a
motion for summary judgment, "is demonstrated to be clearly a sham,
a claim or defense asserted therein which has been rejected by the
fact-finder would be a claim or defense asserted in bad faith or
without substantial justification., 20 8
Maryland Rule 1-341 enables the jury to look at the affidavit and
the prior inconsistent statement and determine which recollection of
the facts they find more reliable. 20 9  Additionally, Rule 1-341
protects the opposing party because if the jury rejects the affidavit
and the trial court is convinced it was a sham, the party who filed the
affidavit may be required to pay for the cost associated with opposing
the affidavit.210 This prevents a party from running up the cost of
litigation by filing a sham affidavit, because, under Rule 1-341, the
filing party may be held liable for her opponent's attorney's fees.
This rule has the same effect as the sham affidavit rule-it just adds
another layer to the analysis. That is, the sham affidavit rule
disregards an affidavit that is in contradiction with a prior
statement. 2 1 Rule 1-341 allows for the same result, but first requires
that the jury be given an opportunity to evaluate all of the evidence
and only if the jury rejects the affidavit can the court decide that the
affidavit was a sham. 12 The trial court may impose sanctions upon
the affiant and her attorney for asserting a claim or defense in bad
faith. 213 This added layer of analysis ensures that the jury's role of
making credibility determinations is not circumvented.
206. Id.
207. See Pittman, 359 Md. at 542-43, 754 A.2d at 1046.
208. Id. at 543, 754 A.2d at 1046.
209. See id. at 542-43, 754 A.2d at 1046.
210. MD. R. 1-341.
211. MD. R. 2-501(e).
212. See Pittman, 359 Md. at 542, 754 A.2d at 1046.
213. MD. R. 1-341. The court may order the affiant or his/her attorney to pay "the costs of
the proceeding and the reasonable expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees,
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c. Sever the issue, so there is not the expense of a full trial
Another alternative to striking an inconsistent affidavit under Rule
2-501(e) is to "sever the issue of material fact involved in the
contradictory statements."' 2 14  Maryland Rule 2-504 contains a
catchall power that "permits the court to order 'any other matter
pertinent to the management of the action."'215 One of the objectives
of "the [s]ummary [j]udgment [r]ule is to prevent the necessity and
expense of preparing for trial on the merits when there is no genuine
dispute of fact in the case and the moving party is entitled 'to
judgment as a matter of law." 216 Maryland Rule 2-504 is consistent
with the summary judgment rule's objective because severing the
material issue involved in the contradictory statements could
potentially avoid the time and cost associated with a full trial.217
Additionally, the mini-trial spares the parties the emotional hardship
of a full trial.
Instead of striking an inconsistent affidavit that is submitted in
opposition to a motion for summar judgment, Rule 2-504 permits
the trial judge to order a mini-trial. The judge can order a trial in
which the only issue is the disputed fact created by the inconsistent
affidavit. 219 This mini-trial allows a jury to weigh the prior statement
and the inconsistent affidavit, then make a factual determination
based on credibility.220 Following the mini-trial, if the jury finds in
favor of the moving party, the trial judge in the main case may grant
summary judgment. Additionally, the judge may impose sanctions
upon the non-moving party if the jury rejected the evidence in the
incurred by the adverse party in opposing [the claim or defense asserted in bad
faith]." Id.
214. Pittman, 359 Md. at 543, 754 A.2d at 1046.
215. Id. at 543, 754 A.2d at 1046 (quoting MD. R. 2-504(b)(2)(G)).
216. Whitcomb v. Horman, 244 Md. 431, 443, 224 A.2d 120, 126 (1966); see Cheney v.
Bell Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 70 Md. App. 163, 166, 520 A.2d 402, 404 (1987) ("The
purpose of Rule 2-501 is to prevent the unnecessary expenditure of time and money
in preparing for trial when there is no genuine dispute of material facts, and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."), aft'd, 315 Md. 761, 556
A.2d 1135 (1989).
217. Pittman, 359 Md. at 543, 754 A.2d at 1046.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. If the jury in the severed portion of the trial finds in favor of the party who moved for
summary judgment, then there is no longer any genuine dispute as to that material
fact. If no other material facts are in dispute, the trial judge may grant summary
judgment. See MD. R. 2-501(f).
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contradictory affidavit and the trial judge is convinced the
contradictory affidavit was a sham.222
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the sham affidavit rule has not yet received much
attention in Maryland, the rule has drastically changed Maryland's
summary judgment procedure. Most importantly, Maryland Rule 2-
501(e) unconstitutionally encroaches on the jury's function of
determining a witness's credibility. 223 Rule 2-501(e) does not require
that an affidavit be incredible as a matter of law-thus eliminating
the question of fact for the jury-before allowing a judge to disregard
it in deciding a motion for summary judgment. Rule 2-501(e) does
not allow a2judge to hear an affiant's explanation for the
contradiction; therefore, the judge has no way of determining
whether the affidavit is incredible as a matter of law. An amendment
to Rule 2-501(e) would remedy the constitutional problem, but there
are other means available to achieve the justifications set forth for the
sham affidavit rule.
It is an important goal of summary judgment to weed out
fraudulent claims. This goal, however, can be achieved in the
absence of even a constitutional sham affidavit rule. Maryland courts
have the power to grant a motion for summary judgment when no
reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party. 22 5 If a judge
finds that the content of an affidavit is so implausible that no
reasonable jury could believe it, the judge can disregard the affidavit.
A trial judge, therefore, in the absence of the sham affidavit rule, has
the power to weed out fraudulent claims.
Additionally, imposing sanctions for submitting a sham affidavit,
rather than striking the affidavit, would promote fairness at the
summary judgment level and would solve many of the problems
posed by sham affidavits themselves. 226  Recommending perjury
charges against a party who submits a sham affidavit could all but
eliminate the problems associated with sham affidavits because the
threat of perjury should eliminate the filing of such affidavits.
Sanctions would also prevent a party from running up the cost of
litigation by knowingly submitting a false affidavit in opposition to a
motion for summary judgment. Furthermore, severing the issue
222. See supra Part V.D. l.a-b.
223. See supra Part V.A. 1-2.
224. See MD. R. 2-501(e).
225. See supra Part V.C.
226. See supra Part V.D.
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created by the contradictory affidavit would save lawyers the stress
and hardship of a full trial.
There are several options available to the trial court when faced
with a sham affidavit. Each of these options ensures that frivolous
claims are not allowed to proceed; the jury is the body making
credibility determinations; and the party submitting the contradictory
affidavit does not gain an unfair advantage. The Court of Appeals of
Maryland should consider striking Maryland Rule 2-501(e) because,
even if the Rule was amended to meet the constitutional requirement,
there are less restrictive means available for dealing with truly sham
affidavits.
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